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The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been
Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?
Eleanor Swift*
Hearsay reformers should be interested in how the hearsay
rule works in practice. Various proposals to abandon current
hearsay policy are put forth in this symposium. A study of how
the rule actually works may significantly affect these proposals.
If, for example, we knew that judicial rulings in the nation's
trial courts already amount to de facto abolition of the hearsay
rule, some reformers might argue that the law ought to be re-
laxed to conform to current practice, while others might con-
clude that we should retrench and reform the law to control
this judicial behavior. Whatever the posture, more information
about how the hearsay rule works in practice-who uses hear-
say, what kind, how often, and with what results-should en-
lighten a reformer's efforts.
In this Article, I report on the results of my research into
what is happening to hearsay,' bearing in mind that the answer
is elusive. Extensive data about the behavior of trial judges to-
ward hearsay is not available. There simply is no record of
most day-to-day rulings on evidence questions. Those rulings
that are recorded in pre-trial orders and in trial transcripts are
not easily accessible. Hotly contested evidence rulings can be
questioned on appeal, but many rulings are not contested and
many cases are not appealed. Thus, published judicial opinions
present only a small sample of what is happening to hearsay.
Other research techniques to investigate daily courtroom be-
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. This paper
benefitted greatly from the work of my research assistants Sue Roeder, Carole
Reagan, Krystal Archibold, and Mari Mazour, and from the comments of my
colleague Robert Cole and my commentator Myrna Raeder.
1. In this Article I focus on what is happening in summary judgments,
bench trials, and jury trials. I have not taken as my topic those judicial actions
to which the rigors and technicalities of evidence law do not apply-for exam-
ple, sentencing and probable cause hearings. Nor have I investigated the vast
array of, administrative proceedings in which administrative law judges treat
the use of hearsay under a "reasonable reliance" standard rather than the cat-
egorical admission process of the common law.
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havior, such as courtroom observation, interviews, and surveys,
would provide only anecdotal information and would be costly.
The inaccessibility of trial court actions regarding hearsay
is a frustrating fact of life. However, published opinions do tell
us something about how the hearsay rule works in practice.
They present a fair sample of the hearsay that is contested and
they obviously influence the subsequent behavior of trial
judges. Valuable information can be gleaned from an extensive
reading of published opinions, even without making claims of
statistical significance for any particular finding.
This Article is an initial effort to report on the hearsay
rule at work-who tries to use hearsay, what kind, and with
what success-recognizing the limitations of available data.
The resulting description sheds new light on existing commen-
tary about judicial treatment of hearsay, and on predictions
about what would happen if the hearsay rule were substantially
liberalized or abolished.2
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE FEDERAL COURT
CASE SAMPLE
Research for this Article included a reading of all of the
federal district and appellate court opinions published in the
LEXIS database that deal with Federal Rules of Evidence
803(1), (2) and (4) from January 1981 to July 1991, Rule 803(3)
from January 1986 to July 1991, and all reported federal appel-
late opinions dealing with Rule 803(6) from January 1987 to
July 1991. 3 Only those opinions that presented a clear decision
either to admit or exclude an item of hearsay under one of the
exceptions were counted.4
2. See, e.g., RIcHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTzBuRG, A MODERN
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 520-25 (2d ed. 1982); 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MAR-
GARET A. BERGER, WEiNSTEmN'S EVIDENCE 800[03], at 800-16 to 800-19 & at
Supp. 7 (1991 & Supp. 1991); Roger C. Park, A Subject Matter Approach to
Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REv. 51, 88-122 (1987); Eleanor Swift, Abolishing
the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REv. 495, 498-518 (1987).
3. The term "published" opinion or case refers to publication on the
LEXIS system, not just in the Federal Reporter or Federal Supplement. The
search called up cases mentioning the particular Federal Rule 803 subsection
within 50 words of the word "hearsay." Because the number of reported cases
citing Rule 803(3) and (6) was much greater than the other exceptions, I lim-
ited my search for Rule 803(3) and (6) opinions to the more recent years, and
for Rule 803(6) to appellate cases only.
4. I did not count those cases in which the court cited the Federal Rule
but did not actually use the rule to decide a hearsay issue. A few cases dealt
with habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners claiming Confrontation
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The categories of admissible hearsay selected for study-
Rule 803(1)-(4) and Rule 803(6)-present interesting contrasts.
Hearsay statements governed by Rule 803(1)-(4) 5 (present sense
impressions, excited utterances, statements of state of mind,
and statements made for medical purposes-the common law's
res gestae) typically involve oral rather than written evidence,
and are not usually generated in the declarant's routine out-of-
court conduct. In addition, these hearsay categories are impor-
tant in tort and criminal cases because they usually relate the
facts that are most sharply contested.6
Hearsay statements governed by Rule 803(6) 7 (business
Clause violations. I counted only those cases in which the federal court indi-
cated its resolution of the hearsay issue decided by the state court.
5. These Rule 803 exceptions read as follows:
(1) Present sense impressions. A statement describing or ex-
plaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiv-
ing the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excite-
ment caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sen-
sation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design,
mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement
of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless
it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of de-
clarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sen-
sations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment.
FED. R. EVm. 803(1)-(4).
6. Professor Park also notes the centricity of the Rule 803(1)-(4) catego-
ries and refers to them as the "transaction exceptions" which admit state-
ments "that are part of the same general transaction or occurrence as
independently admissible nonverbal conduct." Park, supra note 2, at 74.
7. Rule 803(6) reads as follows:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, condi-
tions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from in-
formation transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the reg-
ular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, re-
port, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trust-
worthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes
business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
FED. R. EvD. 803(6).
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records), on the other hand, must be written and must be the
product of a "regular" out-of-court practice. They often do not
report hotly disputed facts. In addition, the Rule 803(1)-(4) ex-
ceptions are strictly categorical and do not refer to "trustwor-
thiness," whereas Rule 803(6) permits the court to consider
trustworthiness as a basis for exclusion.
For purposes of comparison with the federal decisions, I
also read all reported opinions involving these same hearsay ex-
ceptions in two state jurisdictions-Michigan and Florida-that
had adopted a version of the Federal Rules of Evidence.8 The
number of such opinions published from January 1981 to July
1991 in both states was small. It was therefore not possible to
analyze patterns of hearsay use, but Part IV of this Article con-
tains a discussion of these states' judicial interpretations of the
Rule 803(1)-(4) exceptions in cases of alleged sexual abuse of
children.
The fact that a large percentage of federal circuit court
opinions (and in some circuits a majority of the opinions) are
not officially published necessarily limits our ability even to de-
scribe what appellate judges, let alone trial judges, are doing
with hearsay. 9 In general, official publication means that some
8. Both states have modified the Federal Rules of Evidence in interest-
ing ways. For example, "Michigan Rule 803(4) is narrower than Federal Rule
803(4), restricting the exception to the treatment situation by including the
phrase in connection with 'treatment' after 'diagnosis' and changing the word
'pertinent' to 'necessary.'" WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, % 803(4)[02], at
803-154 to 803-155.
The Florida statute contains more variation. Florida Rule 803(1) restricts
the admission of a statement "made under circumstances that indicate its lack
of trustworthiness." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(1) (West 1979). Florida also
modified its versions of Rule 803(3) and (4), but not in ways important to this
Article.
It is significant that both Michigan and Florida omitted residual provisions
similar to the Federal Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5). In 1985, Florida enacted a
special residual exception for statements of abused children. See infra note 94
and accompanying text.
9. At present, no systematic studies exist which even permit us to
reliably estimate how many decisions were unpublished in each of the
years since 1964.... In 1984, [Administrative Office] data suggest that
the rate of nonpublication varied from a low of 33.6 percent in the
Eighth Circuit to a high of 79.2 percent in the Third.
Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals: Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDIcATURE 307, 308
(1990). Michigan publishes relatively few state appellate court opinions. In
1990, for example, of 4,190 opinions, the Michigan Court of Appeals published
only 348 opinions, and released another 128 opinions at the request of the par-
ties. Telephone Interview with Carole Bryde, Deputy Clerk, Michigan Court
of Appeals (Sept. 27, 1991).
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legal issues, but not necessarily the hearsay issues, had prece-
dential value under criteria that differ from circuit to circuit
and from state to state.'0 If unpublished opinions were studied,
new insights into the hearsay rule might indeed emerge.",
Parts II through IV of this Article report the major de-
scriptive insights into the hearsay rule at work that I gained
from study of the federal, Michigan, and Florida opinions. Part
V reports on a small survey of state prosecutors concerning ju-
dicial competence with hearsay. Part VI analyzes how the re-
ported trends in hearsay practice might influence our thinking
about hearsay reform.
II. WHAT IS HAPPENING TO HEARSAY UNDER
RULES 803(1)-(4) AND 803(6)?
Table I reports basic information from the published cases
about federal district court admission of hearsay.
A. DismcTr CoURTS SEE MORE CRIMINAL CASES RAISING
HEARSAY IssUES, Do NOT JUST ROUTINELY ADMIT
HEARSAY, AND ARE SELDOM REVERSED
Table I shows first that for every hearsay exception but
Rule 803(4), criminal prosecutions raise more of the contested
hearsay issues than do civil cases. This is true even though civil
cases preponderate on the trial and appellate dockets in federal
court.'2 Second, district courts certainly have not abolished the
10. While "each circuit continues to operate under its own criteria for de-
termining whether a decision merits publication... the main thrust of the
rules in each circuit is that only decisions with precedential value will be pub-
lished." Songer, supra note 9, at 308. Michigan provides more precise guide-
lines for mandatory publication, such as those cases that establish a new rule
of law, alter or modify an existing rule of law, criticize existing law, or raise
legal issues affecting the public interest. McH. Or. R. 7.215(B).
11. A study of all unpublished opinions in three federal circuits for 1986
suggests that "there are important reasons to include at least a sample of un-
published decisions in most future studies of the courts of appeals." Songer,
supra note 9, at 313. Songer's study reports that these decisions did not uni-
formly affirm the decisions of the court or agency below, that the political val-
ues of the judges appeared to affect their votes in a nontrivial number of
unpublished opinions, that individual judges participated in published opinions
at significantly different rates, and that different circuits may attribute signifi-
cance to appeals based on the status of appellants. IHL at 311-13.
12. Sixty percent of the appellate opinions read for this Article involved
criminal prosecutions. In contrast, only 31% of all federal cases terminated on
the merits during the year ending June 30, 1990 involved criminal cases. AD-
MINmTRATrvE OFFIcE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1990 REPORT OF THE DnRECTOR:
ACTrIvITIEs OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFIcE 106 (1990) [hereinafter ADMINIS-
1992]
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TABLE I
GENERAL INFORMATION ON FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
ADMISSION OF HEARSAY
Federal Total Civil Criminal Total Trial % Total Total Total
Rule of Cases Court Court Admits Appeals Errors Reversible
Evidence Admits Excludes Errors
803(1) 37 16 21 24 13 65% 26 6 2
803121 31 10 21 22 9 71% 27 7 3
803(3) 60 19 41 30 30 50% 45 14 8
803(41 27 Is 9 16 11 59% is 5 5
Subtotal 155 63 92 92 63 59% 116 32 18
803(6) 82 34 48 67 15 82% 82 19 7
Total 237 97 140 159 78 67% 198 51 25
hearsay rule under these five exceptions by admitting hearsay
whenever it is offered. In fact, Table I shows that in the re-
ported cases dealing with Rule 803(1)-(4), district courts have
excluded the hearsay in forty-one percent of the cases.
13
Finally, whether federal district courts admit or exclude
the hearsay, appellate courts usually uphold the district courts'
decision on appeal. Table I shows that twenty-six percent 14 of
the district courts' decisions were found erroneous but in only
thirteen percent' 5 of the cases did the errors cause reversal.
This rate of reversal corresponds with overall reversal rates for
civil and criminal cases,16 but the impression is unmistakable
that many federal appellate courts do not think it is their role
TRATIVE OFFIcE REPORT]. These figures exclude prisoner petitions, bank-
ruptcy cases, administrative appeals, and original proceedings, which, if
included, would tip the caseload even more strongly toward civil cases. Id.
During the same year, courts completed 11,502 civil trials as compared to 8931
criminal trials. 1d. at 161. Other researchers have also noted that criminal
cases disproportionately involve evidentiary issues. See Mark M. Dobson, Evi-
dence, 1987 Survey of Florida Law, 12 NOVA L. REv. 463, 464 n.4 (1988) (Dur-
ing 1987, 67% of criminal appellate cases in the Florida state courts discussed
evidentiary issues, while only 33% of the civil opinions did so.).
13. District courts admitted hearsay in 59% of the cases, see tbl. I, and ex-
cluded hearsay in the remaining 41% of the cases.
14. Fifty-one of 198. See supra tbl. I.
15. Twenty-five of 198. See supra tbl. I.
16. Overall, the circuit courts reversed in 13% of appeals terminated on
the merits during the year ending June 30, 1990. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE RE-
PORT, supra note 12, at 121. (Again, this figure excludes prisoner petitions,
bankruptcy cases, administrative appeals, and original proceedings.) But see
David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 937, 966 n.129 (1990) (citing authorities suggesting that reversal rates for
evidentiary errors in federal courts are disproportionately low).
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to review district court admission and exclusion decisions care-
fully. The deferential "abuse of discretion" standard of re-
view17 produces a low rate of trial court error. Sometimes,
appellate courts decline to decide the question of error at all. 8
And, when error is found, the harmless error doctrine reduces
even further the rate of actual reversal, as the next table
shows.19
B. REVERSmLE ERROR is MoRE FREQUENT iN CIVIL THAN IN
CRI MNAL CASES
Table II reports the number of errors that were found to
require reversal compared with the total number of errors com-
mitted in admitting hearsay on behalf of each party. Table II
shows that prosecutors are very successful in having admission
of hearsay upheld. While making ten findings of error in crimi-
nal cases under Rule 803(1)-(4), appellate courts reversed only
one case. And while making six findings of error under 803(6),
appellate courts reversed only two cases. Overall, appellate
courts reversed only three of the sixteen (19%) criminal cases.
Reversals in civil cases for the improper admission of hear-
17. Many federal circuit courts recite variations of the following litany
prior to deciding evidence issues:
Before turning to appellants' specific claims, we recognize 'the
long held view of this Circuit that the trial judge is in the best posi-
tion to weigh competing interests in deciding whether or not to admit
certain evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, the decision of the
trial judge to admit or reject evidence will not be overturned by an
appellate court.'
United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1015 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
Circuit courts do, however, recognize that correct construction of the Fed-
eral Rules is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. United States v. Lai,
934 F.2d 1414, 1419, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 947 (1992).
18. See, ag., United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1989)
("Thus, even if the admission of the records violated the hearsay rules or the
confrontation clause, an issue we do not decide, such error was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.").
19. Whether appellate courts are abusing the harmless error doctrine is
an important topic that is beyond the scope of this Article. In the cases read
for this Article, harmless error was often found because the declarant also tes-
tified. The hearsay item was then "merely cumulative," even if erroneously
admitted. This analysis ignores the powerful impact that a prior consistent
hearsay statement can have. In three Florida cases, the courts recognized the
harmful effect of improperly admitting a victim's prior consistent hearsay
statement when charges of sexual abuse boiled down to a credibility contest
between the victim and the accused. See Kopko v. State, 577 So. 2d 956, 962
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Lazarowicz v. State, 561 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990); Bradley v. State, 546 So. 2d 445, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
1992]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
TABLE II
REVERSIBLE ERRORS BY PARTY
Civil Plaintiff Civil Defendant Prosecutor Criminal Defendant
Federal - TRule of -ev Total Ree~l Total Aaovebe Total R&oto.le Total
Evidence E--oo E-ta Eftot, Eatot Otto, I-00 Wo E-to
803111 0 1 1 1 1 3 0 0
803121 0 0 2 4 0 4 0 0
803[3) 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 0
80314) 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0
Sub-Total 3 4 4 7 1 10 0 0
803(61 3 4 2 6 2 6 0 0
Total 6 8 1 13 3 1 0 0
say are far more frequent.20 Table II shows that of twenty-one
errors found in civil cases, appellate courts reversed twelve
(57%) decisions. This higher rate of reversal in civil cases con-
tradicts the generally held view that courts strictly enforce the
exclusion of hearsay in criminal cases.2 1 Possible explanations
include judicial reluctance to expend governmental resources in
new criminal trials, better preparation of criminal cases
through police work, or tolerance of error in criminal cases
when judges believe that the defendant is guilty.
C. IN THE PUBLISHED CASES, PLAINTIFFS AND PROSECUTORS
USE MORE HEARSAY
Table III shows, for each respective party, the number of
published attempts to offer hearsay under Rule 803(1)-(4), the
number of successful admissions (after "correction" by the ap-
pellate court where applicable), and the resulting rate of suc-
cessful hearsay use. The figures in Table III reveal a consistent
level of attempted use of hearsay by plaintiffs and prosecutors
across all exceptions, a lower level of attempted use by civil de-
fendants, and with the exception of Rule 803(3), an even lower
20. Overall reversal rates in federal courts support this finding generally,
but do not reveal the comparative numbers of harmful versus harmless errors.
In the year ending June 30, 1990, the circuit courts reversed twice as often in
civil cases than in criminal cases (eight percent of criminal appeals and 16% of
civil appeals-excluding prisoner petitions, bankruptcy cases, and administra-
tive appeals). ADMINsTATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 12, at 121.
21. Professor Park states that "the judicial attitude toward exclusion ap-
pears to be stricter in criminal cases." Park, supra note 2, at 87. Park relied
on the proposition asserted by Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger that
"[r]eversible error is found considerably more frequently in criminal cases
where hearsay is improperly admitted against a defendant." WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 2, 1 800[03], at 800-18. The published cases summarized in
Table II do not support this proposition.
[Vol. 76:473
HEARSAY IN PRACTICE
TABLE III
SUCCESSFUL USE OF HEARSAY BY PARTY
Civil Plaintff Civil Defendant Prosecutor Criminal DefendantFederal
Rule of T. W1 ,T Tol . % Tol G- % T" Q- %
Evidence o. W_~L z M0. 4.o 00.501.. AA.. Ot401110
$0311) tt S 45% 5 3 60% 1 10 63% 0%
903121 7 3 43% 3 1 33% Is 13 72% 3 o 0%_
8033) 15 o 67% 4 4 100% 16 12 75% 24%
is34) 10 7 54% 5 3 60% 1 8 M% 00%
Tote 46 25 54% 17 11 65% 5 34 7 21%
level of use by criminal defendants. What explains this? Per-
haps plaintiffs and prosecutors pursue those cases in which at
least some of the transactional hearsay (hearsay that follows
closely on the litigated events) supports their claim. Then, they
try to use this hearsay because they bear the burdens of proof
in civil and criminal cases.
It is surprising, however, that civil defendants are under-
represented as hearsay users even in the cases dealing with
business records, as is shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV
SUCCESSFUL USE OF BUSINESS RECORDS BY PARTY
F Civil Plaintiff Civil Defendant Prosecutor Criminal DefendantIFederall
I Rleof Tl o.) 1% To 0.1.0 1 Tod 0..1 % Tod 1.W 1 1
I Evidence Off- A00,0 0000 0Off-0. 4.. 01.. 001 00.. 01.. 400
$03()8 20 II 55% 14 5 3% 44 35 6 3% 4 1 25%
The figures in Table IV show that civil defendants were propo-
nents of hearsay in only fourteen of the eighty-two (17%) total
business records cases. This is somewhat counter-intuitive.
Professors Lempert and Saltzburg have written that wealthy
organizations "are likely to have access to more hearsay evi-
dence than the individuals they oppose." 2 Business records ex-
emplify the type of hearsay that civil defendants, which are
large organizations in most of the published cases, can create
and utilize to their advantage.p
Perhaps civil defendants show up less frequently in the
published cases because the hearsay they offer is more clearly
admissible and thus contested less frequently. There is, how-
22. LEMPERT & SALTzBuRG, supra note 2, at 521.
23. 'Where the information is recorded in files, it may have been recorded
selectively by agents who elicited information by leading questions or who in-
cluded only what they thought their superiors most wanted to hear, and it
may include statements by individuals of doubtful credibility." Id at 522.
1992]
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ever, a high rate of error in civil defendants' use of business
records (five errors found in fourteen attempts by civil defend-
ants, plus two findings that admission of the evidence was
"harmless" whether erroneous or not). Another possible expla-
nation, suggested by Professor Raeder in her Comment to this
Article, is that tactical trial considerations motivate civil de-
fendants to present live witnesses whenever possible and to
avoid the use of hotly disputed hearsay.2
D. CERTAIN PARTIES SEEM To HAVE MORE SuccEss GETING
THEIR HEARSAY ADMrrED AND UPHELD
Tables III and IV also show the rate of success in securing
admission of hearsay by the respective parties. Prosecutors are
the most successful: Seventy-four percent of their attempts re-
sulted in admission under the Rule 803(1)-(4) exceptions, and
eighty-two percent were successful under Rule 803(6). Crimi-
nal defendants, on the other hand, found the exclusion of their
hearsay upheld in more than seventy-five percent of their
attempts.25
In civil cases, plaintiffs were successful in getting their
hearsay admitted in approximately fifty-five percent of the at-
tempts decided under both Rule 803(1)-(4) and Rule 803(6).
Civil defendants were more successful under Rule 803(1)-(4)
24. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been Abol-
ished De Facto by Judicial Discretion, 76 MINN. L. REV. 507, 509-10 (1992).
25. These figures do not include criminal acquittals since prosecutors can-
not appeal such cases. In those cases we might expect to find more exclusion
of prosecutors' hearsay and more admission of defendants' hearsay, thus
changing the prosecutors' and defendants' success rates. Although the govern-
ment can appeal certain types of final orders and certain interlocutory rulings,
including suppression of evidence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988), the gov-
ernment cannot appeal evidentiary rulings after jeopardy has attached. See
Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of
the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 53 (1990). In sev-
eral reported Michigan cases, the pre-trial suppression of prosecutors' hearsay
that had led to dismissal of the criminal charges was reversed on appeal. See,
e.g., People v. Edgar, 317 N.W.2d 675, 677-78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). Neverthe-
less, the published criminal appeals are a fair sample of how courts resolve
contested hearsay issues in criminal cases. Only 20% of criminal cases tried in
federal court result in acquittal, so 80% of criminal trials are subject to appel-
late review. See AD-M-STRATE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 12, at 196. Dur-
ing the reported period, there were 56,519 total criminal defendants. Of these
criminal defendants, 8193 obtained a dismissal and 40,452 pled guilty or nolo
contendere. Of the remaining 7874 criminal defendants, judges convicted 14%,
juries convicted 66%, and the remaining 20% were acquitted. Id. It is also
claimed that most convicted defendants do appeal and do raise any possibly
significant legal issue. See Stith, supra, at 13 n.39.
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than Rule 803(6), getting hearsay admitted in sixty-five percent
of their attempts under the former, but in only thirty-six per-
cent under the latter.
There may or may not be statistical significance in the
comparative success rates in these published cases, but a rough
pattern does emerge. With Rule 803(1)-(4) hearsay, prosecutors
are far more successful than all other parties, and civil defend-
ants may be slightly more successful than plaintiffs.
A common sense explanation of these comparative success
rates would be that prosecutors are better at securing admissi-
ble hearsay, given their resources at the crime scene and the re-
petitive nature of the cases they try. Plaintiffs need to use
more contested hearsay than do defendants to fulfill their pro-
duction burden, and more of their hearsay (indeed, about fifty
percent of it) may be questionable.
A critic of the justice system might say, however, that so-
cial, political, and economic values affect judicial decision-mak-
ing-even decisions about the admission of hearsay. Such a
critic would hypothesize that outcomes are influenced by who
is offering the hearsay. In a system where the perception of be-
ing soft on crime can be politically damaging for the court,
prosecutors may get almost any hearsay admitted and are then
successful on appeal. Courts may also treat civil defendants
(who generally represent more established economic and socie-
tal interests) generously, while treating civil plaintiffs (under-
dogs seeking to change the status quo in their favor) grudgingly
and with suspicion. Criminal defendants, particularly in the
drug and organized crime cases that inhabit the federal courts,
get nowhere with hearsay. According to these explanations,
judges have not abolished the hearsay rule de facto, but they
may be discriminating in their application of it sub rosa.
Some commentators suggest that judges do exhibit bias
against criminal defendants when they make decisions as a
matter of "judicial discretion" in other contexts. 2 6 However,
26. See J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-choice Approach to Limiting
Prejudicial Evidence, 64 IND. L.J. 831, 838, 864-65 (1989). Professor Tanford re-
ports that a random sample of opinions reviewing the admissibility of prejudi-
cial evidence demonstrates that "appellate courts systematically rule against
criminal defendants when making prejudice rule decisions." Id. at 865. Others
suggest that judicial bias may be class-based. Id at 865 n.229. If so, judges
could be predisposed against some civil plaintiffs.
The study of unpublished federal appellate decisions, discussed by
Songer, supra note 9, reports that "the Eleventh Circuit was more than twice
as likely as the Fourth Circuit to publish opinions in cases with underdog ap-
pellants and all of the differences were [statistically] significant." Id at 313.
19921
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the trial court's decision to admit or exclude hearsay is sup-
posed to be categorical, not discretionary. The categorical
structure of the rule is intended to control the effects of judi-
cial bias or favoritism.27 So if the admission or exclusion of
hearsay favors certain parties and disfavors others, this might
be evidence that judges are inserting a more subjective and dis-
cretionary criterion of trustworthiness into the categorical
rules.28 A closer look at the Rule 803(1)-(4) cases, however,
suggests another explanation for the pattern of overall rulings
that operates irrespective of alleged discretionary biases of cur-
rent federal judges.
E. DIFFERENCES IN THE TYPES OF HEARSAY DECLARANTS
OFFERED BY THE PARTIES UNDER RULE 803(1)-(4) MAY
EXPLAIN PROSECUTORS' COMPARATIVE SUCCESS
There is a certain degree of consistency in the types of con-
tested declarants' statements offered by prosecutors, criminal
defendants, and civil plaintiffs. Less consistency exists in the
hearsay offered by civil defendants. Moreover, the Rule 803(1)-
(4) exceptions seem to operate consistently in favor of the types
of statements prosecutors offer, and against the types of state-
ments criminal defendants and civil plaintiffs offer. This sug-
gests an explanation for the comparative success rates of the
parties that is rooted in hearsay policy.
In the cases represented in Table III, forty-five percent of
the hearsay statements offered by prosecutors (twenty-six of
fifty-eight) were made by crime victims, and courts admitted
these statements primarily under the exceptions for excited ut-
terances and statements made for medical purposes. Forty-
three percent of the hearsay statements offered by plaintiffs
(twenty of forty-six) were plaintiffs' own out-of-court state-
ments about the accident or other injury. Eighty-eight percent
of the hearsay statements offered by criminal defendants
Songer concludes that judges in the Fourth Circuit were much less likely than
their counterparts on the Eleventh Circuit to attribute significance to appeals
brought by lower status appellants. "Nothing in the official criteria for publi-
cation of the two circuits suggests that such a difference should exist and thus
the difference is most likely attributable to value preferences of the judges."
id-
27. Indeed, this is one of the principal arguments favoring the categorical
process of admitting hearsay over a discretionary approach. See LEMPERT &
SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 523.
28. For cases that reflect this trend see infira notes 57, 69 and accompany-
ing text.
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(thirty of thirty-four) were defendants' own out-of-court state-
ments, expressing the defendants' innocent state of mind after
the alleged crime, and even after arrest. Civil defendants of-
fered statements made by a variety of declarants.29
If we ask why prosecutors, plaintiffs, and criminal defend-
ants offer these recurring types of declarants' statements, the
answer is simple: They have access to them and they need
them. Prosecutors need the statements of victims to prove the
crime and the perpetrator. If the victim does not testify, the
prosecutor may still use evidence of the victim's previous out-
of-court statements. If the victim does testify, these hearsay
statements are useful to corroborate the in-court testimony.
Similarly, civil plaintiffs, particularly tort victims, need their
own statements to prove the tort or other civil wrong, and to
prove damages. If the plaintiff does not testify (usually because
he or she is deceased), the plaintiffs own prior hearsay state-
ment may be available. Again, the plaintiff's own hearsay is po-
tent corroboration even if the plaintiff does testify. Criminal
defendants often do not testify in their own defense, but they
would like to present their own exculpatory story to the trier
of fact. Thus, criminal defendants resort to statements they
made outside of court, primarily using the Rule 803(3) excep-
tion for "state of mind. 30
Common sense may explain why these types of hearsay
statements are consistently offered, but why there is something
of a consistent judicial response to them in the published opin-
ions must still be examined. Is there over-exclusion of the
hearsay offered by criminal defendants and civil plaintiffs that
amounts to judicial "revision" of the hearsay rule? Is there
over-admission of the hearsay offered by prosecutors that
amounts to judicial "abolition?"
The answers to these questions, arrived at in Parts III and
IV of this Article, can be briefly stated. It does not appear that
judges are revising the Federal Rules to over-exclude the hear-
say statements of civil tort plaintiffs and criminal defendants;
29. Civil defendants offered statements made by their own employees in
only three cases. They also offered observations made by third parties under
Rule 803(1) and 803(2), and medical records that incorporated information pre-
viously related by plaintiffs under Rule 803(4).
30. One district attorney wrote in response to a written survey conducted
for this Article that when defendants get this type of hearsay admitted, "this
tactic helps defendant's attorneys get in defendant's defense without having to
put their client on the stand." See infra note 97 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing how the written survey was conducted).
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the decisions are justifiable textbook applications of the cate-
gorical exceptions. Expansive treatment of the exceptions does
occur, however, when judges admit the hearsay statements of
crime victims. The comparative utility of the Rule 803(1)-(4)
exceptions for admitting the statements of crime victims versus
the statements of civil tort victims is striking.
III. CURRENT HEARSAY POLICY UNDER RULES
803(1)-(4) OPERATES AGAINST "RISKY
DECLARANTS"
Criminal defendants and civil plaintiffs appear to have two
things in common: They seek to admit their own statements as
hearsay and they do not fare well in getting them admitted.
Why? Simply put, the out-of-court statements of these parties
illustrate the types of circumstantial sincerity risks that the
hearsay rule has always sought to exclude.3' One circumstan-
tial risk of the declarant's insincerity results from the fact that
such statements are typically made after the events that gave
rise to the litigation. Another arises because these statements
are usually self-serving; the civil plaintiff's statement attributes
cause or fault; the criminal defendant's statement expresses the
defendant's innocence.
In a previous article, I described the paradigm "risky de-
clarant" who demonstrated these classic sincerity risks.32 The
paradigm was a civil tort plaintiff injured in an industrial acci-
31. Professor Imwinkelried traces the history of what he calls the com-
mon law "obsession" with sincerity risks, an obsession shared by generations
of evidence rule drafters. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of the
Memory Factor in Analyzing the Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson
Slowly Learnt-and Quickly Forgotten, 41 FLA. L. REv. 215, 219-22 (1989). The
emphasis on sincerity remains in the Federal Rules, although the Rules also
stress the problem of the declarant's memory. Id& at 228-29.
32. Swift, supra note 2, at 495-98. Three paradigm declarants described in
the article represent three of the principal problems addressed by the hearsay
rule. My purpose was to analyze whether other rules of admission and exclu-
sion and the rules evaluating sufficiency would exert any limits on the use of
hearsay spoken by these three declarants if the hearsay rule was abolished. I
also examined what effect free admission would have on the factfinder, the
parties, and the adversary system. The three paradigm declarants were the:
1. Abstract declarant, presenting the problem of evaluating the
reliability of a hearsay statement with only minimal information
about its source;
2. Risky declarant, presenting the problem of evaluating hearsay
motivated by self-serving interests; and
3. Burden-shifting declarant, presenting the problem of trial "by
affidavit" or "by business record" which shifts the burden onto the
opponent to impeach a wholly documentary case.
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dent. The circumstances in which she spoke outside of court
gave her a motive to blame the accident on the malfunctioning
of the machine, rather than on herself.33
In the recent federal cases, similar risky declarants-civil
tort plaintiffs4 and criminal defendantsa-offered self-serving
out-of-court statements. These "risky" hearsay statements,
which supposedly bear an unacceptable risk of insincerity, are
being excluded from trials, thus showing that the hearsay rule
has not been abolished. My reading of most of the cases sug-
gests that the courts carefully applied the categorical excep-
tions. Thus, judges excluded the "present sense impressions" of
civil plaintiffs that were not contemporaneous with the per-
ceived event under Rule 803(1).36 They excluded "excited ut-
Id at 498-518.
In the recent federal cases discussed in this current Article, courts ex-
clude the statements made by the abstract and risky declarants. The docu-
mentary burden-shifting declarant did not appear, but an additional type did
appear-the child victim of alleged sex abuse. See infra part IV.
33. The paradigm case was Land v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 582 F. Supp.
1484, 1485-86 (E.D. Mich. 1984). The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the
machine that she had been operating, but she died before trial from unrelated
causes and thus was not available to testify about what happened to her. She
made the hearsay statement eight days after the accident to an adjustor for
her employer's unemployment insurance company. In granting the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment, the district court held that Mrs. Land's
statement did not fall within any hearsay exception. I& at 1486, 1489.
34. See, eg., Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co., 922 F.2d 272, 277-283 (5th Cir.
1991) (statement by seaman afflicted with a twisted ankle attributing fall to
hole in deck); Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 889-90 (9th Cir.
1991) (statement by victim of a biking accident that "the brakes failed"); Gong
v. Hirsch, 913 F.2d 1269, 1272-74 (7th Cir. 1990) (statement by plaintiff suing
for medical malpractice reporting the cause of ulcer); Williams v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 922 F.2d 1357, 1359-61 (8th Cir. 1990) (statement by plaintiff suing
for negligence reporting details of accident); Clemente v. Espinosa, 749 F.
Supp. 672, 680-81 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (statement by plaintiff suing for slander);
Ramrattan v. Burger King Corp., 656 F. Supp. 522, 530 (D. Md. 1987) (state-
ment by plaintiff passenger in a car hit by a delivery truck reporting which
vehicle ran the red light).
35. Thirty of the 38 attempts by criminal defendants to use hearsay in-
volve their own statements. See supra tbls. Il and IV. See, e.g., United States
v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1991) (exculpatory conversations with
informer three months after conspiracy terminated excluded under 803(3));
United States v. Elem, 845 F.2d 170, 174 (8th Cir. 1988) (post-arrest exculpa-
tory statement excluded under 803(2)); United States v. Bancroft, No. 86-1554,
1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12191, at *4-5 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 1987) (defendant's letter
to his wife describing the alleged crime, written two weeks after the crime, ex-
cluded under 803(1)).
36. See Huffco Gas, 922 F.2d at 280-81 (excluding accident report filed by
plaintiff two days after the accident); Pau, 928 F.2d at 890 (excluding utterance
made two days after the accident).
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terances" by plaintiffs due to an insufficient showing of "stress"
caused by a startling event.37 They excluded statements of
plaintiffs' state of mind as irrelevant or as impermissible state-
ments of belief to prove a past fact remembered. 38 And judges
excluded plaintiffs' statements to physicians as not "reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" under Rule 803(4) when
the statements contained specific descriptions of cause or attrib-
uted fault.39 Some trial courts viewed medical histories offered
by injured plaintiffs as too self-serving (too "risky") to be relia-
ble when offered by the plaintiff at trial, but if the statements
contained historical facts about pain and treatment, the appel-
late courts required admission.40 Plaintiffs' statements con-
tained in medical records were admitted as admissions, whether
risky or not, when offered by defendants. 41
The post-crime, and usually post-arrest, exculpatory state-
37. See, e.g., Pau, 928 F.2d at 889-90. But see Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d
941, 945 (8th Cir. 1988) (reversing exclusion of statements made by a three-
year-old sexual abuse victim and providing an expansive interpretation of the
Rule 803(2) excited utterance exception). Morgan is discussed in the text ac-
companying infra notes 63-69.
38. See Huffco Gas, 922 F.2d at 279 (finding plaintiff's statements of pain
caused by twisted ankle not relevant to the dispute); Mayoza v. Heinold Com-
modities, Inc., 871 F.2d 672, 675-76 (7th Cir. 1989) (excluding plaintiff's expres-
sions of shock after being told that he held worthless investments in silver as
an improper statement of "belief" to prove a fact remembered-that he had
not authorized the investment).
39. See Hu~ffco Gas, 922 F.2d at 277-78 (admitting plaintiff's statements
that he twisted his ankle, but excluding statements regarding the specific
cause of the accident-falling through a rusted-out step or slipping in some
grease); Gong v. Hirsch, 913 F.2d 1269, 1272-74 (7th Cir. 1990) (excluding plain-
tiff's statement that defendant's administration of prednisone caused his ul-
cer); Roberts v. Hollocher, 664 F.2d 200, 204-05 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that if
the doctor's conclusion that plaintiff's injuries were caused by "excessive force
... were based on Roberts' statements to the doctor, we would have none of
the guarantees of proper motive and trustworthiness"); Ramrattan v. Burger
King Corp., 656 F. Supp. 522, 530 (D. Md. 1987) (excluding statements in hospi-
tal record as to which vehicle ran the red light and caused the accident).
40. See Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 922 F.2d 1357, 1362-63 (8th Cir.
1990); Wooldridge v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 157, 159-60 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Elmer
v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535, 544-45 (D. Del. 1988); Harrigan v.
New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 693 F. Supp. 1531, 1532 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
41. See Navarro de Cosine v. Hospital Pavia, 922 F.2d 926, 933 (1st Cir.
1991) (admitting notes of social worker written directly on plaintiff's medical
record because the notes were recorded for the purpose of obtaining treat-
ment); Onujiogu v. United States, 817 F.2d 3, 4-6 (1st Cir. 1987) (admitting hos-
pital record as an admission that four-year-old pulled pot of hot water onto
himself and mother, but ignoring issue of whether the emergency room nurse
would record such a specific statement of cause as part of her regular medical
practice); Harrell v. Fibreboard, No. 85-4604, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14196, at
*22-26 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 1989) (admitting medical records under a combination
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ments of criminal defendants were excluded as not being suffi-
ciently contemporaneous with any relevant perceived event
under Rule 803(1);42 as not proved to be made while "excited"
by anything under Rule 803(2);43 as not describing any relevant
then existing state of mind under Rule 803(3);44 or as attempt-
ing to use state of mind simply to prove past facts. 45 The fed-
eral courts seem to apply the "state of mind" doctrine with
great care.46 When criminal defendants made statements that
reflected an innocent state of mind before the crime occurred,
these statements were admitted under Rule 803(3). 47
of the Rule 803(6) business records exception and Rule 803(4) medical records
exception).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Bancroft, No. 86-1554, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS
12191, at *4-5 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 1987) (excluding letter written two weeks after
the crime); United States v. Tucker, No. 90 CR 651, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2790, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 1991) (excluding the exculpatory statement
made to defendant's lawyer at the time of a prior plea, that defendant did not
know the gun was in the car, because the statement was not made in response
to a perception of a condition).
43. See United States v. Elem, 845 F.2d 170, 173-74 (8th Cir. 1988) (exclud-
ing defendant's exculpatory statement to police during custody that defendant
did not own the gun because the statement was not made while excited).
44. In some cases, statements of then existing state of mind were ex-
cluded as irrelevant to any disputed issue. See, e.g., United States v. Grant, No.
90-1159, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 13709, at *6-11 (6th Cir. June 24, 1991) (finding
taped statements concerning personal life and relation to co-defendant not ex-
culpatory and therefore irrelevant), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1628 (1991); United
States v. French, 900 F.2d 1300, 130203 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding statement of
intent to sell gun on day of arrest irrelevant because the gun was indisputably
still in defendant's possession during drug sale and subsequent arrest).
In other cases, statements by defendants recalling their past state of mind
of innocence were excluded as not contemporaneous with the state of mind
sought to be proved. See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 423-24
(2d Cir. 1991) (excluding defendant's statement recorded three months after
conspiracy ended); United States v. Carter, 910 F.2d 1524, 1530 (7th Cir. 1990)
(excluding defendant's statement to his mother that he had confessed one
hour earlier to save his girlfriend).
45. Several cases apply "the fact remembered" exclusionary clause of
803(3) very accurately. See, e.g., United States v. Scrima, 819 F.2d 996, 1000
(11th Cir. 1987) (holding defendant's statement to a friend that he had ample
funds to invest irrelevant in proving his belief and inadmissible if offered to
prove the fact remembered-that he actually had the money).
46. This was also true in the civil cases decided under Rule 803(3). When
civil plaintiffs offered hearsay statements made by customers or potential cus-
tomers to prove beliefs about products, or statements by employers to prove
motivation for job terminations, courts made sure that the declarants' state of
mind was relevant, and that their statements were not being used to prove the
truth of facts believed. See e.g., Kassel v. Gannett Co. Inc., 875 F.2d 935, 945-46
(1st Cir. 1989); Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, 741 F.
Supp. 1546, 1551-61 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
47. See United States v. Peak, 856 F.2d 825, 832-34 (7th Cir.) (statement
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An avowed purpose of the traditional hearsay rule has
been to winnow out hearsay statements bearing unacceptable
sincerity risks. The Rule 803(1)-(4) exceptions operate to ex-
clude self-serving statements made by parties after the occur-
rence of the litigated events. If we assume that such
statements bear unacceptable risks, the published cases show
that the hearsay rule is working.
IV. ADMISSION OF STATEMENTS BY CHILD VICTIMS
ARE EXPANDING THE EXCITED UTTERANCE
AND MEDICAL STATEMENT
EXCEPTIONS
Prosecutors are far more successful in using the hearsay
statements of crime victims, also made after the occurrence of
the litigated events, under the Rule 803(1)-(4) exceptions.
Ninety-two percent of the statements of crime victims admitted
by district courts (twenty-two of twenty-four offered) were up-
held on appeal4 8 -one under Rule 803(1); nine of eleven under
Rule 803(2),49 three of four under Rule 803(3), and all eight
under Rule 803(4). Allegedly sexually abused children made
nine of the victim statements.
In these cases, federal courts used three primary tech-
niques to expand the admission of hearsay. While this judicial
behavior does not amount to abolition of the hearsay rule, it
does expand the categories of admission beyond the more tradi-
tional view of hearsay risks still imposed in civil tort cases and
threatens to subvert what remains of the categorical structure
of the Federal Rules.5°
made to defendant's brother, also a co-defendant, during planning stages of the
crime), cert denied, 488 U.S. 969 (1988); United States v. Dempsey, No. 89 CR
666, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15181, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Sept 17, 1990) (taped state-
ment on phone to informant).
48. The 24 cases in which prosecutors offered hearsay statements by
crime victims represent a subset of the study's 58 cases in which prosecutors
offered hearsay under the Rule 803(1)-(4) exceptions. See supra tbl. I.
49. In United States v. Ellis, the court held that the statements were
harmless, if erroneously admitted. 935 F.2d 385, 392-93 (1st Cir.) (statements
of child victim describing past assaults made to mother over a period of several
hours), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 201 (1991). In United States v. Sherlock, the
court held that the statements were inadmissible, but that the error was harm-
less. 865 F.2d 1069, 1083 (9th Cir. 1989) (statements by victims of sexual as-
sault one hour or more after the attack, and after victims had already told
several other people about it).
50. Professor Jonakait has demonstrated that judicial interpretation of
the residual exceptions to admit grand jury testimony not only stretches the
boundaries of the specific exceptions but threatens to override the categorical
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First, courts have made explicit new interpretations of the
terms of the categorical exceptions to respond to recurring fact
patterns that generate useful, and often necessary, hearsay for
the prosecution.5 1 Second, courts have liberally applied the
standard categorical terms to justify wider admission of victims'
statements. This is a process driven by the imperatives of the
adversary system and the doctrinal dynamic of the broad and
ambiguous terms used in the Federal Rules. As parties make
creative arguments, judges will creatively apply these flexible
terms to a large number of varied fact situations. The initial re-
strictive meanings of the terms may be lost. The process re-
sembles erosion more than outright abolition of the hearsay
rule.
5 2
Finally, discretionary judicial admission of "trustworthy"
hearsay-explicitly rejected by the Advisory Committee for the
overall structure of the Rules0-is appearing in cases decided
under Rule 803(1)-(4). Judges make what sounds like their
own assessment of the credibility of the hearsay declarant.
They then justify admission of the hearsay under categorical
exceptions that do not include a trustworthiness test, asserting
that "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" surround
the out-of-court statement.A This is a radical departure from
traditional hearsay policy. Courts correctly refuse to consider
factors related to the declarant's untrustworthiness to exclude
hearsay that falls within a categorical exception.55 Thus, im-
structure. "As a result, the fundamental hearsay framework adopted in the
Federal Rules of Evidence is being subverted." Randolph N. Jonakait, The
Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual Hearsay Exceptions, Circum-
stantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury Testimony, 36 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 431, 433 (1986).
51. Interpretation usually includes a discussion of the doctrinal terms and
a restatement of their meaning, often resulting in a judicial gloss added to the
exception. For an example, see infra text accompanying note 76, discussing
the "same household" test applied in child sexual abuse cases. This type of
rule interpretation is usually controlled by appellate courts under the de novo
or plenary standard of review accorded to questions of law.
52. Appellate courts review these fact-contingent applications of doctrine
with great deference. The United States Supreme Court held in Cooter & Gell
v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990), that these "fact-specific" rulings
should be reviewed under the "abuse of discretion" test. Id. at 2460.
53. FED. R. EvID. art. VIII advisory committee's note (Introductory Note:
The Hearsay Problem).
54. For a discussion of these cases, see infra note 57, text accompanying
note 68, and note 69.
55. See United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 573-74 (7th Cir. 1986). But
see Overton v. State, 429 So. 2d 722, 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (using lack of
trustworthiness to exclude under 803(2) by importing the test of 803(1)); Solo-
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portation of the trustworthiness factor into exceptions where it
is not mentioned is a doctrinal dynamic that functions in one
direction: for admission, but not for exclusion. As judges im-
port this discretionary trustworthiness factor into more and
more exceptions, the categorical structure of the hearsay rule is
subverted.1 These three judicial techniques are illustrated in
the published cases involving the exceptions for excited utter-
ances and for statements made for medical purposes.57
A. EXCITED UTTERANCES
The victim statements admitted in the published cases as
excited utterances under Rule 803(2) are typically made after
the alleged crime, identify the perpetrator, and are spoken to
the police, neighbors or, when children are involved, parents.
The ultimate question posed in applying the exception is
mon v. Shuell, 457 N.W.2d 669, 680-82 (Mich. 1990) (importing the trustworthi-
ness test of 803(6) into 803(8) in order to justify exclusion).
56. Evaluations of trustworthiness are, obviously, highly fact-contingent
judgments. If the trial court makes an evaluation of credibil-
ity/trustworthiness, it is reviewed under the "abuse of discretion" standard,
the most deferential standard. But it is appellate courts, not just trial courts,
that are importing the trustworthiness factor into admission decisions. For ex-
amples of such appellate court decisions see infra note 57, text accompanying
note 68, and note 69.
57. The techniques also appeared in cases involving statements of observ-
ers of litigated events offered under Rule 803(1). In United States v. Parker,
936 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1991), the court justified admission by reinterpreting
Rule 803(1) to add the gloss of "substantial contemporaneity" to the doctrinal
requirement of "immediately thereafter." I& at 954. In addition, the Parker
court invoked the trustworthiness factor, finding its conclusion about contem-
poraneity "buttressed by the intrinsic reliability of the statements" even
though the categorical exception makes no reference to trustworthiness. Id
In First State Bank of Denton v. Maryland Casualty Co., 918 F.2d 38 (5th Cir.
1990), the court took a further step toward integrating the trustworthiness fac-
tor into the categorical structure by referring to the Rule 803(24) catch-all ex-
ception to admit the hearsay item, "even assuming it did not meet the precise
contours of rule 803(1)." Id. at 42.
The only consistent technique used to expand admission of the documen-
tary records in criminal cases was the courts' application of Rule 803(6) over
the arguably pertinent public records exception of Rule 803(8). In several
cases, the prosecutor offered police, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other
law enforcement records under Rule 803(6). Under the reasoning of United
States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977), these records should have been ex-
cluded as public records used by the prosecution under Rule 803(8)(B) or (C).
Id at 66-68. In United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1988), the only
case in which this problem of overlap was mentioned, the court held that the
reasoning of Oates did not apply when the author of the report testifies, thus
eliminating the Confrontation Clause problem. Id at 1229-30. In the other
Rule 803(6) cases, it is doubtful that the author testified, thus leaving the over-
lap problem unsolved.
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whether the statement is "a spontaneous reaction to the [star-
tling] occurrence or event and not the result of reflective
thought. 58
In addressing statements made by adult victims of violent
crimes, courts narrowly apply the doctrinal requirement that
the declarant be "under the stress of excitement." They reason
that pain reduces the capacity to fabricate,5 9 and they look for
evidence of the kind of stress that minimizes the declarant's
time and opportunity to reflect consciously on what
happened.60
In cases involving victims of non-violent crimes, the courts
substantially reduce the physical stress requirement. At least
in the reported cases, however, the time elapsed between star-
tling event and statement was also much shorter, a matter of a
few minutes.61 This may have increased the courts' confidence
that the declarants' statements were not the product of reflec-
tion. We cannot be sure, however, because there is little doctri-
nal analysis in these cases; in their opinions, the appellate
courts rely on the trial courts' factual finding that the categori-
cal condition of stress was satisfied.62
When the crime victim is a child who makes an out-of-
court statement about sexual abuse, courts have responded by
58. CHARLEs McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVI-
DENcE § 297, at 85455 (3d ed. 1984).
59. See Smith v. Fairman, 862 F.2d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 1988), cert denied,
490 U.S. 1008 (1989).
60. See United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1017 (2d Cir. 1990) (state-
ment by severely beaten victim who was "very nervous" and who spoke ap-
proximately five hours after the attack, just after his sister screamed when he
entered the emergency room); Jones v. Greer, 627 F. Supp. 1481, 1492 (C.D. Ill.
1986) (statement by victim of gunshot wound to police fifteen minutes after at-
tack). In Smith v. Fairman, the court approved admission of declarant's state-
ment made shortly after he was punched in the face, but disapproved
admission of a second statement made to police after the declarant "had time
to reflect on the events... and organize them." 862 F.2d at 636.
61. See United States v. Reich, No. 85-1993, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 5289, at
*6-7 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 1987) (victim's statement, regarding defendant imper-
sonating a federal employee, made to neighbor "at the time of the defendant's
startling request" when victim appeared "very upset and nervous"); United
States v. Bailey, No. 87-1023, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15727, at *26-29 (1st Cir.
Dec. 3, 1987) (juror's statement, regarding defendant's proposition to change
her vote, made to neighbor within three minutes of the incident when juror
appeared "nervous [and] upset").
62. Two other appellate opinions explicitly relied on the discretionary na-
ture of the trial court's ruling to uphold the finding of adequate stress. See
United States v. Lawrence, 699 F.2d 697, 703-04 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 461 U.S.
935 (1983); United States v. Golden, 671 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir.), cert denied,
456 U.S. 919 (1982).
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using the three techniques discussed above to expand the ex-
cited utterance exception. A civil case that relies on precedent
from federal criminal cases involving child victims best illus-
trates the court's use of a new interpretation of categorical
terms, of a liberal application of the terms to the facts, and of
the trustworthiness factor in an exception that makes no refer-
ence to trustworthiness at all. In Morgan v. Foretich,6 3 the
child victim's mother sued the child's father for damages on be-
half of her daughter. The district judge excluded all of the
hearsay statements about the father's abuse that Morgan's
daughter Hilary had made to her mother. The court excluded
the statements under Rule 803(2) primarily because the child
was incompetent as a witness at the time she made the state-
ments. As a result, the defendant secured a jury verdict in his
favor. Morgan appealed and obtained a reversal by the Fourth
Circuit on the basis of several evidence rulings.64
First, to justify admission of Hilary's statements as excited
utterances, the Fourth Circuit relied on a new doctrinal test in-
troduced in criminal cases.65 This new test allows the categori-
cal requirement of being "under stress" to cover a child who
does not report the startling events for hours or days. Under
this new doctrinal gloss on the categorical term, the lapse of
time is not measured from the event itself but rather from the
time of the "first real opportunity" to report the events to a
care-taker, usually a relative. The Morgan court adopted this
"first real opportunity" test of spontaneity on grounds that chil-
dren's lack of understanding of abusive events, and the fear and
guilt they experience, cause them to delay reporting.66 Of
course, this justification addresses only the sincerity risks, not
the increased memory risks that also result from delay, a prob-
lem overlooked in the opinion.
Second, the Fourth Circuit applied the new categorical re-
quirement of "first opportunity" to the facts surrounding Hil-
ary's statements in a liberal way, inasmuch as the child waited
several hours after being reunited with the mother to speak
with her. This additional delay in reporting, fatal to most "ex-
cited utterances," was justified by Hilary's tender years and her
nearly hysterical condition. It is "virtually inconceivable," the
63. 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988).
64. Id at 945-47.
65. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 85-86 (8th Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir.
1979).
66. Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947.
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Morgan court held, that the child, less than four years old,
would have the desire to lie required to fabricate her story.67
Finally, the Morgan court also invoked the discretionary
trustworthiness factor by relying on the circumstantial guaran-
tees of the trustworthiness of Hilary's statements that had
nothing to do with whether the statements were excited utter-
ances. Hilary's method of speaking-touching herself and use
of vocabulary-and her physical condition "lead to the conclu-
sion that... [the statements] are trustworthy and should have
been admitted into evidence. '68 By so explicitly relying on
other "guarantees" of trustworthiness to admit Hilary's state-
ments under a categorical exception, the court's opinion erodes
the categorical limits of the current hearsay rule. When this
pro-admission technique is combined with new interpretations
and liberal applications of the exceptions, one can see how the
imperatives of the prosecutor's need for evidence and the doc-
trinal dynamic of the Federal Rules contribute to this erosion.69
67. I at 948. Several state cases also illustrate the liberal application of
the doctrinal requirement of stress in cases involving children. In People v.
White, 555 N.E.2d 1241 (IlM. App. Ct. 1990), aff'd sub nom White v. Illinois, 112
S. Ct. 736 (1992), the child victim underwent two periods of questioning by a
babysitter and her mother before making a statement to the police, 45 minutes
after the event. The trial court held that the statement was spontaneous. I&
at 1250. The appellate court relied on a generalization that "it is unlikely that
a child of tender years will have any reason to fabricate stories of sexual
abuse." I& at 1249. See also State v. Plant, 461 N.W.2d 253, 264 (Neb. 1990)
(upholding admission of an "excited utterance" made by a four-year-old two
days after the alleged events and after police questioning).
68. Morgan, 846 F.2d at 948.
69. Prosecutors' use of statements made by accomplices or undercover
agents that implicate the criminal defendant also stretch the doctrinal limits
of excited utterances under Rule 803(2). In United States v. Vazquez, 857 F.2d
857 (1st Cir. 1988), the declarant was an accomplice being questioned in a
United States customs office after cocaine had been found in his luggage. The
alleged "startling event" was a statement by his colleague, also being ques-
tioned in the same room, "I don't know you." I& at 859. The declarant, ac-
cording to the testimony of the customs officer, responded angrily "[y]ou know
me.... I'm going to get all the blame and you guys are going to get out." I&
In United States v. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), the declar-
ant was an undercover police officer who described a drug delivery almost fif-
teen minutes after receiving the contraband and a few minutes after making
the arrest. I- at 334. The court describes the "successful arrest" and "pent-up
tension of his performance" as the necessary startling event. I& at 339. Under
this approach, every police statement made after a "somewhat chaotic arrest"
would qualify as an excited utterance. This would result in the de facto aboli-
tion of the hearsay rule.
In a Minnesota state case (not counted in this survey because the state evi-
dence ruling was not approved by a federal court), the declarant, an accom-
plice to murder, returned to his apartment 90 minutes after the crime and told
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B. STATEMENTS MADE FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES
Most statements offered by prosecutors under Rule 803(4)
involved statements made by child victims of sexual abuse.
When the child victim's statements identified the abuser-a
clear attribution of guilt that would be impermissible under the
exception as it is applied in the typical civil personal injury
case 7°--courts found ways to admit the identifications as being
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 71
The Eighth Circuit, the locus of many federal prosecutions
for child abuse, has developed a new interpretation of Rule
803(4) under its doctrine of "same household" to justify admis-
sion of child identifications of the alleged abuser.72 This doc-
trine is premised on the theory that the nature and extent of
the child's psychological problem will depend upon the identity
of the abuser and thus may be essential ("reasonably perti-
his neighbor that "Scott" (the defendant) got carried away. The evidence of
stress was that he looked "unnerved" and threw or slid a cup in frustration.
State v. Berrisford, 361 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. 1985). It is doubtful that this
declarant lacked the time or opportunity to reflect on the event or organize his
thoughts.
One federal and one state reviewing court introduced the discretionary
trustworthiness factor to justify admission when the categorical limits of Rule
803(2) were strained. See United States v. Vasquez, 857 F.2d at 864 (finding
that declarant's statement "has sufficiently substantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness to allow its admission as an exception to the hearsay rule"); State v.
Berrisford, 361 N.W.2d at 850 ("This basis of trustworthiness allows the admis-
sion of the statements in the discretion of the trial court as excited utterance
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The corroborating evidence also provides cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."). It bears repeating that the cate-
gorical structure of admission/exclusion decisions is undermined if the more
discretionary term "general trustworthiness" is equated to "stress."
70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
71. In contrast to statements by child victims, courts hold statements by
adult victims to a stricter standard. See, e.g., United States v. Iron Thunder,
714 F.2d 765, 773 (8th Cir. 1983) (admitting adult victim's description of rape
only because it "did not point to the persons responsible for her condition").
72. Several cases raising hearsay issues under Rule 803(4) involve federal
prosecutions for crimes committed on Native American lands. See United
States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172, 177 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 859 (1989);
United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 882 F.2d 1360, 1363-64 (8th Cir. 1989), va-
cated and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 3267 (1990), affirmed on remand, 933 F.2d 1471
(1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1187 (1992); United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601,
608-09 (8th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988); United States v.
Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 435-39 (8th Cir. 1985).
Two habeas corpus cases upheld the admission of statements under a simi-
lar "same household" test when applying state hearsay rules and the Confron-
tation Clause. See Gregory v. State of North Carolina, 900 F.2d 705, 706 (4th
Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 211 (1990); Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1224-26
(7th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1042 (1990).
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nent") to treatment under Rule 803(4).73 This interpretation
has opened the door, at least in child abuse cases, to accusatory
statements against members of the victim's household made
months after the alleged abuse74 under conditions of direct and
insistent questioning,75 and has even been broadened to include
identification of relatives who do not share the "same house-
hold" with the child.7 6
Other courts have also broadly applied the requirement
that the statement be for "medical diagnosis or treatment."
Justice Lewis Powell (sitting by designation and concurring in
Morgan v. Foretich) noted the absence of any finding by the
district court that the child victim believed that her discussions
with a doctor had a "treatment" or "helping" purpose.7 7 Justice
Powell acknowledged the loss of trustworthiness resulting from
the expanded application of Rule 803(4) to statements made to
physicians consulted only as expert witnesses. He reasoned
that in such circumstances the professional objectivity of the
doctor is reduced and the veracity of the declarant's statements
is less certain.78 Thus, he argued for application of the Rule 403
balancing test where no real treatment motive existed.
The most expansive new interpretation or liberal applica-
tion of Rule 803(4) appears in the recent opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in White v. illinois.7 9 There, Justice
Rehnquist upheld admission of a statement of identification
made by a child sex abuse victim to an examining nurse and
doctor as being "made in the course of receiving medical
care."8 0 This reading of the exception appears to eliminate any
73. See Renville, 779 F.2d at 436-37.
74. See Shaw, 824 F.2d at 608-09 (statement made to doctor one year after
the initial report).
75. See Spotted War Bonnet, 882 F.2d at 1366-67 (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (al-
leging a government social worker employed manipulative interview tactics).
76. See Provost, 875 F.2d at 176-77 (expanding same household doctrine to
include "same immediate family" in the case of the victim's half brother who
did not share the same household but "at times" resided at victim's house).
77. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 952 (4th Cir. 1988) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
78. Id In United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 435-39 (8th Cir. 1985),
the court emphasized that the motive to speak truthfully about the perpetra-
tor's identity depends on the physician making clear that the identity is impor-
tant to the diagnosis and treatment. Id. at 438. See also Nelson v. Farrey, 874
F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (7th Cir. 1989) (testifying therapist had seen the child victim
for 59 treatment and evaluation sessions), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1042 (1990).
79. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
80. Id. at 742.
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requirement of treatment motive, and makes no mention of any
treatment-related purpose of the identification itself.
These expansive readings of Rules 803(2) and 803(4), com-
bined with the liberal use of the Rule 803(24) catch-all excep-
tion, create the sense that much of what a child victim says
outside of court about being sexually abused will be admitted in
federal trials. When the child victim does not also testify at
trial, the criminal defendant is burdened with impeaching a
case built on victim hearsay."' In criminal cases, when no
showing is made that the child is unable to testify, fairness is-
sues rise to the constitutional level.8 2 Cases involving child vic-
tim hearsay fully bear out the prediction of Professors Lempert
and Saltzburg that liberalization of the hearsay rule will make
the prosecutor's task easier.8 3
C. THE ADMISSION OF CHILD VICTIM STATEMENTS IN
MICHIGAN AND FLORIDA
Many of the published cases decided under the Rule 803(2)
and 803(4) exceptions in Michigan involved the statements of
child victims of alleged sexual abuse.84 The Michigan Supreme
Court has issued landmark opinions carefully interpreting each
81. The child witness thus creates a new type of burden-shifting declar-
ant. See supra note 32. Presentation of hearsay always reduces the risks for
the proponent and imposes more risks on the opponent. See Swift, supra note
2, at 514-16. Specifically, young children who could not withstand the court-
room tests of oath and competency may "testify" as hearsay declarants. Id. at
515. See also Morgan, 846 F.2d at 948-50.
82. The United States Supreme Court addressed the question whether a
child's unavailability is required by the Confrontation Clause in White v. Ill-
nois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992). The Court held that the Confrontation Clause did
not require the prosecution to produce the four-year-old child victim of a sex-
ual assault at trial or find the victim unavailable before the child's out-of-court
statements could be admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception or
medical examination exception. Id. at 742-43. When not required to justify the
use of hearsay with the declarant's unavailability, the prosecution is free to
employ all the tactical advantages of choosing hearsay over the live witness. It
is unfortunate that the Confrontation Clause is not being read to limit such
adversarial advantage-taking by the government. See, Eileen A. Scallen, Con-
stitutional Dimension of Hearsay Reformn Toward a Three-Dimensional Con-
frontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REv. 623 (1992).
83. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 522.
84. From January 1981 to July 1991, the Michigan Appellate Courts and
Supreme Court made 39 published rulings under Michigan's Rule 803(2) ex-
ception. Thirty-eight of these rulings were made in criminal prosecutions; of
these, 17 concerned statements of child victims reporting sexual abuse.
From January 1981 to July 1991, the Michigan courts made 21 published
rulings under the Rule 803(4) exception. Eleven involved criminal cases, and
of these, 10 involved child victim statements.
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of these exceptions. In People v. Kreiner,85 the court required
the laying of a specific foundation under Rule 803(2) regarding
the amount of time between the alleged sexual trauma and the
child's report.8 6 In People v. LaLone,s 7 the court held that a
child's statement identifying the perpetrator to a psychologist
was not relevant to diagnosis or treatment and therefore should
not have been admitted under Rule 803(4).88 The court re-
jected the "same household" rule adopted in earlier appellate
opinions, stating that the drafters of the rule did not intend
that the naming of an assailant be considered a description of
the general character of the cause or external source of in-
jury, 9 and that action to protect the child from the abuser was
not part of medical treatment.9° The court stated that any
broadening of the doctrinal terms to admit specific statements
of fault should be accomplished through legislative
amendment.91
Similarly, many cases decided by the Florida courts under
Rules 803(2) and 803(4) involve statements by child victims.92
The Florida courts have taken a very restrictive view of Rule
803(2), declining to admit child statements made even as little
85. 329 N.W.2d 716 (Mich. 1982) (per curiam).
86. I& at 720. The court rejected Michigan's common law "tender years"
exception (which permitted excusable delay in reporting) as not surviving the
adoption of Rule 803(2). In cases subsequent to Kreiner, the Michigan courts
have rejected child statements as not "excited" when made after long delays,
or after prior opportunities to report, or in response to questioning. See, e.g.,
People v. Straight, 424 N.W.2d 257, 258-261 (Mich. 1988); People v. McConnell,
358 N.W.2d 895, 896 (Mich. 1984).
87. 437 N.W.2d 611 (Mich. 1989).
88. Id. at 613-16.
89. I& at 614. The court also reasoned that statements made in the course
of psychological treatment were less reliable than those made for medical
treatment. Id. at 613.
90. Id. at 614-15.
91. Id. at 616. The Michigan appellate courts have followed LaLone in ex-
cluding statements of identification, but have expressed reluctance in so doing.
One court held that an identification was pertinent to medical care in order to
protect the victim from sexually transmitted diseases. See People v. Meeboer,
449 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), appeal granted, in part, 461 N.W.2d
484 (Mich. 1990). In other cases, the error in admitting an identification was
held harmless. See, e.g., People v. Hackney, 455 N.W.2d 358, 363-65 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990).
92. All 15 rulings published from January 1981 to July 1991 under Flor-
ida's equivalent of 803(2) were in criminal cases. Of the 15, six involved child
victim statements.
Of 16 rulings published from January 1981 to July 1991 under Florida's
equivalent to 803(4), 13 were in criminal cases. Of the 13, eight involved child
victim statements.
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as one hour after the alleged abuse. Although noting the spe-
cial circumstances that generate delays in child abuse cases, the
Florida Supreme Court has held that the limits of its version of
803(2) could not be stretched to accommodate delayed reports.93
Part of the reason for the court's rigor in applying Rule 803(2)
may be that in 1985 the Florida legislature adopted a special
residual exception, Rule 803(23). Under this exception, state-
ments of children under the age of eleven that describe child or
sexual abuse may be admitted after the trial court makes a
finding of "reliability. '94
Until 1991, Florida courts had also consistently rejected the
use of Rule 803(4) to admit statements identifying the perpetra-
tor, even in cases of child abuse.95 In one very recent case,
93. State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660, 662-63 (Fla. 1988). In only one published
case did a statement made one hour after the alleged abuse qualify as an ex-
cited utterance; the victim-declarant in that case was suffering from vaginal
bleeding. Jackson v. State, 419 So. 2d 394, 395-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
94. Florida's Evidence Code provides:
(23) Hearsay exception; statement of child victim.
(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circum-
stances by which the statement is reported indicates a lack of trust-
worthiness, an out-of-court statement made by a child victim with a
physical, mental, emotional, or developmental age of 11 or less
describing any act of child abuse or neglect, any act of sexual abuse
against a child, the offense of child abuse, the offense of aggravated
child abuse, or any offense involving an unlawful sexual act, contact,
intrusion, or penetration performed in the presence of, with, by or on
the declarant child, not otherwise admissible, is admissible in evi-
dence in any civil or criminal proceeding if:
1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence
of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement
provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. In making its determina-
tion, the court may consider the mental and physical age and maturity
of the child, the nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the rela-
tionship of the child to the offender, the reliability of the assertion,
the reliability of the child victim, and any other factor deemed appro-
priate; and
2. The child either:
a. Testifies; or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is other cor-
roborative evidence of the abuse or offense. Unavailability shall in-
clude a finding by the court that the child's participation in the trial
or proceeding would result in a substantial likelihood of severe emo-
tional or mental harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804(1).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West 1992).
95. See, e.g., Kopko v. State, 577 So. 2d 956, 960 n.8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (per curiam). Courts occasionally mitigated the rigorous application of
the exception with harmless error rulings, but have refused to adopt broadly
the "same household" exception or other expansive interpretation in the pub-
lished cases. One court has even held that a report of rape, with no identifica-
tion, was not pertinent to a pregnancy examination. Bradley v. State, 546 So.
2d 445, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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however, a Florida appellate court adopted the "same house-
hold" rule, permitting the admission of identifications made by
abused children during medical treatment when the abuse took
place within the home.96
V. STATE DISTRICT ATTORNEY SURVEY RESULTS:
SOME VIEWS OF JUDICIAL COMPETENCE
WITH HEARSAY
I conducted a brief and modest survey of 169 state district
prosecutors on the question of judicial competence with hear-
say.97  The purpose of the survey was to gain insight into
whether trial judges are abolishing the hearsay rule in practice,
and to test the survey method for its usefulness in the future.
In brief, the prosecutors reported their perception that
state court trial judges significantly misunderstand the hearsay
rule and fail to apply it correctly.98 This perception was shared
equally between those who practice in federal rules and non-
federal rules jurisdictions.99 Interestingly, there was no consen-
sus that judges are "abolishing" the hearsay rule by over-admit-
ting hearsay. The prosecutors were split fairly evenly between
those who believe that when judges err they over-admit, and
those who believe that judges over-exclude; indeed, a slightly
higher percentage of the respondents cited error of over-exclu-
sion.1°° This result may be affected by partisanship, but some
of the cited judicial mistakes worked in favor of the state and
against the defense. At the least, the survey indicates that trial
judges do not simply admit anything and everything out of frus-
tration with the hearsay rule.
The survey also asked the prosecutors to cite particular
problems of over-admission that could amount to abuse of the
rule. Sixty-one percent of those answering (thirty of forty-
96. See Flanagan v. State, 586 So. 2d 1085, 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(en banc).
97. These prosecutors provided a convenient sample for the simple reason
that they had attended a National College of District Attorneys' Career Prose-
cutor Course in the summer of 1991 and the address list was made available to
me through the help of Professor Ed Imwinkelried, who lectured at the
course.
98. I received 68 responses to the survey. Forty-six (68%) responded that
in their view trial judges do not understand the hearsay rule and fail to apply
it correctly either "frequently" or "about 50/50."
99. Twenty-two of the 46 district attorneys who responded "frequently" or
"about 50/50" practiced in federal rules jurisdictions.
100. Fifty-two percent (33 of 64) responded that judges tend to over-ex-
clude when they do not apply the hearsay rule correctly.
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nine) stated that the criminal defendant's own statements, usu-
ally self-serving, made to the police upon arrest or to others,
were widely admitted when offered by defense counsel in abuse
of the hearsay rule. Some respondents mentioned that judges
perceived these statements as admissions, even though offered
on behalf of the defendant. Others thought that trial courts ex-
hibit a general leniency with regard to hearsay offered by de-
fendants. Some prosecutors indicated their belief that judges
are lenient with the defendant when they believe that the de-
fendant is innocent or that the state's case is extremely strong.
In federal court, by contrast, leniency does not appear to
extend to defendants' self-exonerating statements. As dis-
cussed earlier, federal courts frequently and rigorously apply
Rule 803(3) to exclude self-serving statements made outside of
court by criminal defendants.101 A study of United States attor-
neys would be needed to test their perceptions of federal trial
court leniency toward defendants against these published cases.
VI. THE EFFECTS OF HEARSAY PRACTICE ON
HEARSAY REFORM
Several findings from this study are useful for hearsay re-
formers. First, civil plaintiffs have difficulty using their own
"risky" hearsay statements. Second, civil defendants appear to
use contested hearsay less frequently than plaintiffs. Third,
criminal defendants cannot secure admission of their own self-
exonerating statements, at least in federal court. Finally, pros-
ecutors are successful hearsay users, particularly when offering
statements of crime victims.
The abolition of the hearsay rule in civil cases advocated by
some reformers would permit plaintiffs to use their own
"risky" statements at trial. Likewise, under the notice-based
liberalization of the rule proposed by Professor Park, the self-
serving statements of unavailable plaintiffs (tort plaintiffs who
die before trial) would be admitted.10 2 The only other restric-
tion on admission that Professor Park envisions would be a re-
quired showing that the plaintiff-declarant had first-hand
knowledge of the events spoken about.'0 3
It is certainly reasonable to assume that fact-finders can as-
101. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
102. Park, supra note 2, at 119-22.
103. Id at 121. Professor Park noted that Rule 403 should not be used to
winnow out such statements on the basis of hearsay risks. I& at 122. See also
Swift, supra note 2, at 501-02, 509.
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sess the reliability of these risky declarants.1°4 What follows
from this study of the published cases, however, is that aboli-
tion and notice-based liberalization of the hearsay rules would
affect the civil parties differently. A deceased plaintiffs own
statement, excluded under the current rule, would suffice to
make a prima facie case,105 or would at least be helpful corrobo-
ration. If it is true that civil defendants use contested hearsay
in fewer cases than do plaintiffs, then liberalizing the rule
would have more immediate benefits to the whole class of
plaintiffs.1' 6 Professor Park acknowledges that liberalization
could benefit "underdog" litigants,10 7 but more extensive study
of such differential effects is needed.
The frequent unsuccessful attempts by criminal defendants
to use their own post-arrest statements illustrate what would
happen if the admissibility of hearsay was governed by a gen-
eral test of probative value versus prejudice-the test once ad-
vocated by Judge Weinstein and rejected by the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee. 08 Judges would be faced with the unap-
pealing task of determining the credibility of criminal defend-
ants as part of the process of admitting evidence. To decide
that the accused's post-crime assertion of an innocent state of
mind is not trustworthy, thus not probative, and thus not ad-
missible, smacks of a prejudgment of guilt. The result might
be, of course, the wide-scale admission of criminal defendant
statements, similar to what state prosecutors currently perceive
to be the practice in state courts. But judges, as a group, may
already be suspicious of the criminal defendant;'09 to encourage
wide latitude in excluding statements on grounds of untrust-
worthiness might be undesirable. The use of trustworthiness to
admit hearsay, however, surfaces in the successful use by prose-
cutors of the Rule 803(1)-(4) exceptions. The discretionary
trustworthiness factor is imported into exceptions where its use
104. See Swift, supra note 2, at 509.
105. See Rock v. Huffco Gas, 922 F.2d 272, 283 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant because plaintiff's hearsay statements ex-
cluded); Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1991)
(same).
106. Professors Lempert and Saltzburg also predicted that abolition would
"change the balance" on the burden of proof, making it "easier to introduce
the evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case." LEMPERT &
SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 522.
107. Park, supra note 2, at 65.
108. See Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv.
331, 338-39 (1961).
109. See supra note 26.
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is not literally sanctioned,110 and thus it erodes the categorical
limits. Moreover, as has been pointed out,"1 the catch-all ex-
ceptions are in danger of becoming just that-useful to catch
and admit all of the hearsay excluded at the margins of the cat-
egorical exceptions.
If we extrapolate from these admittedly limited observa-
tions, a radical change in how the hearsay rule works may be
well under way. The rule is not being abolished de facto, but
hearsay practice may be at an important turning point. The
categorical structure of the admission/exclusion decision may
be giving way to a more flexible process that openly acknow-
ledges the trustworthiness factor. Further study is needed to
test the validity of this hypothesis, but several possible reper-
cussions for hearsay reform are already clear.
First, to the extent that the transformation of the categori-
cal structure is under way, it may be impossible to control. As
stated earlier, appellate courts do not see themselves as being
in the business of policing trials for evidentiary errors. The use
of "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" triggers the
most deferential standard of review, and the appellate courts
themselves are using this phrase to justify findings of harmless
error at the margins of the exceptions.112
Although the trustworthiness standard may strike some as
sound hearsay policy, it does deprive the litigants of whatever
degree of predictability the categorical approach provided, and
it seems to favor the hearsay used by some parties more than
others. Moreover, the trustworthiness issue that judges import
into the categories operates in only one direction-in favor of
admission-whereas the trustworthiness standard that was
drafted into certain exceptions permits exclusion if judges
make a finding of untrustworthiness. Admission, not exclu-
sion, thus becomes the dynamic force in current judicial deci-
sion-making about hearsay.
Finally, hearsay reformers should pay special attention to
the types of declarants and the types of cases that put intense
110. See supra note 57, text accompanying note 68, and note 69.
111. See Jonakait, supra note 50, at 461-62; Raeder, supra note 24, at 514-17
(commentary to this Article).
112. It will be interesting to see how courts apply the constitutionalized
test of "trustworthiness" under the Confrontation Clause, as explicated in
Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149-51 (1990). See, e.g., United States v. Spot-
ted War Bonnet, 933 F.2d 1471, 1473-74 (8th Cir. 1991) (majority sidesteps
"trustworthiness" test because declarants also testified and were cross-ex-
amined at trial), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1187 (1992).
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pressure on the categorical structure of the hearsay rule. This
study found that the cases involving child victims presented re-
petitive hearsay issues, litigated over and over in each jurisdic-
tion by essentially the same proponent, the prosecutor. The
results indicate that arguments of need are a powerful force in
the dynamic of hearsay doctrine. There are three observed re-
sponses to this type of intense pressure. First, the categorical
exceptions themselves are transformed through new judicial in-
terpretations and increasingly liberal applications, as has hap-
pened in federal court under Rules 803(2) and (4). Second, as is
also happening, problematic hearsay spills over into the generic
catch-all exceptions and is admitted. Finally, the specific bal-
ance between the prosecution's interest in admitting child vic-
tim hearsay and the defense's interest in exclusion is addressed
in specific residual exceptions, such as Florida's Rule 803(23),
aimed directly at the problem. Recognizing the alternatives
permits reformers to consider where to aim their efforts.
This study of how the hearsay rule works in practice has
identified important trends that can now be used to inform
judges of the changes they are working, and to illuminate the
process of reform.
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